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Major law schools are defined by the presence of major scholars, and 
from time to time, scholars in a field become concentrated, creating an 
intellectual movement identified with a particular place and time, such 
as legal realism at Yale and Columbia in the 1920s and 1930s and law 
and economics at Chicago from the 1970s on.  Although not at a single 
institution, in the 1980s and 1990s, the two ends of a stretch along 
Interstate 90 marked such a time and place.  At Northwestern University 
School of Law, Ian Macneil built the magnificent intellectual edifice  
of relational contract theory, and Richard Speidel, who once described 
himself as a Midwesterner who naturally had “a mainstream orientation,”1  
 
 *  Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden.  
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Dick Speidel.  Thanks to David Campbell and 
Rick Swedloff for their comments. 
 1. Richard E. Speidel, Edward J. Murphy: The Man and the Casebook, 71 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 571, 572 (1996). 
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glided easily between grand relational theory and practical application.2  
Macneil and Speidel produced a series of works on relational contract in 
theory and practice and collaborated with Thomas Stipanowich on what 
may be the most underappreciated treatise in the history of American 
legal scholarship.3  At the University of Wisconsin Law School at Madison, 
Stewart Macaulay, John Kidwell, and William Whitford produced 
pathbreaking works of empirical contracts scholarship that added further 
grounding to the relational approach and a coursebook—casebook is not 
the right name—that uniquely focused, as its title stated, on Contracts: 
Law in Action.4 
Just as legal realism fell out of vogue and ultimately became inculcated in 
legal culture as a set of insights so watered down from their original 
strength as to seem banal, so too is relational contract theory no longer 
the talk of the town among contracts scholars.  I use the occasion of this 
symposium dedicated to the memory of Dick Speidel to bring renewed 
attention to relational contract theory, to suggest a dimension of it that 
has been understated in the literature, and to illustrate its application to a 
particular doctrinal problem in insurance law.  That problem is the standard 
to be applied to evaluate the behavior of insurance companies in first-
party bad faith cases—cases in which a policyholder alleges that the 
insurance company, its contracting partner, has violated the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing that is present in every contract and intensified in 
insurance contracts. 
I.  RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY 
A.  A Summary of Relational Contract Theory 
Relational contract theory contains an anthropological account of 
human interaction.  It begins with the “primal roots of contract” and 
yields a theory that is remarkably broad in scope.5  The core is exchange, 
which includes any social interaction in which reciprocity is a major 
element.  Contract is narrower but not much narrower, including any 
 
 2. The addition in 1987 of a young Ian Ayres added further luster to Northwestern’s 
contract faculty. 
 3. 1–5 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION 
ACT (1999). 
 4. 1 STEWART MACAULAY, JOHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM WHITFORD, CONTRACTS: 
LAW IN ACTION, at iii (2d ed. LexisNexis 2003) (1995). 
 5. Macneil identifies the primal roots of contract as society, specialization of labor and 
exchange, choice, and awareness of future.  IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: 
AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 1–4 (1980).  See also Jay M. 
Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 741 (2000). 
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interaction “in which economic exchange is a significant factor.”6 The 
anthropology reveals that contract occurs along a spectrum.  At one end 
is the discrete exchange, the isolated, narrowly focused, wealth-maximizing 
exchange that is the paradigm of neoclassical economics and of classical 
contract law.  At the other end is the relational contract, extending over 
time, involving a range of performance elements and personal relationships, 
and ill-suited to complete planning at the moment of its formation.  In 
between are transactions having discrete and relational characteristics 
and taking an infinite variety of forms.  Although the discrete transaction 
was long the model for understanding the social institution known as the 
market and the body of contract law that enabled and regulated it, in 
fact, exchange relations are far more common than discrete exchanges.  
Indeed, the discrete exchange is little more than an intellectual construct 
because even the most discrete exchange is situated within a framework 
of relations that help define, support, and bound it.7 
This descriptive component of relational contract theory leads directly 
into its normative component.  Exchange as a social process gives rise to 
norms, “[A] case of an ‘is’ creating an ‘ought.’”8  Macneil identified ten 
common contract norms that are immanent in the institution of exchange 
itself; these include such norms as role integrity, reciprocity, the 
implementation of planning, and propriety of means.9  Some of these 
norms are intensified by discrete and relational exchanges, respectively.  
For example, the narrowly focused and well-defined nature of discrete 
exchanges causes the norms of implementation of planning and effectuation 
of consent to be given greater emphasis.10  The breadth and openness of 
relational exchanges, on the other hand, give greater importance to 
maintaining the integrity of one’s role within the relation and to 
harmonizing the relation with the surrounding social matrix.11 
 
 6. IAN R. MACNEIL & PAUL J. GUDEL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
AND RELATIONS, at v (3d ed. 2001). 
 7. See David Campbell, The Relational Constitution of the Discrete Contract, in 
CONTRACT AND ECONOMIC ORGANISATION 40 (David Campbell & Peter Vincent-Jones 
eds., 1996). 
 8. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors 
Lindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 272, 274 (1987). 
 9. MACNEIL, supra note 5, at 36–59. 
 10. Id. at 59–64. 
 11. Id. at 64–70; Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. 
L. REV. 340, 364–66 (1983). 
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The contract norms are not expressed in the parties’ agreement but are 
a source of obligation nonetheless.  Indeed, for Macneil, these immanent 
norms yield “more precise, intellectually coherent principles which are 
nevertheless sufficiently open-textured for effective use in the law of 
modern contractual relations.”12 
Although the norms are abstract and general, their use in the law is 
not.  A necessary step in the translation of relational principles into legal 
principles is to contextualize them.  This contextualization both places 
particular contracts or kinds of contracts along the relational-discrete 
continuum and focuses on functional categories, such as long-term 
relationships involving sophisticated commercial parties and insurance 
contracts involving consumers, the subject matter of this Article.  The 
contract norms are also supplemented by norms that are external to the 
relation, including norms derived from the setting in which the relation 
is situated, such as “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing”13 
in the trade and general social values, such as controls on the abuse of 
power. 
One source of relational contract theory’s power is that it is both 
general and contextual.  It treats exchange at the most general level and 
it contextualizes to examine specific types of relations.  Within that 
contextualization, one might identify emphasis on two strains of contracts at 
the relational end of the continuum.  One strain focuses on the long-term 
contract between sophisticated commercial parties of relative equality.  
This strain emphasizes the limited nature of the initial planning of the 
relation and the need for ongoing cooperation and accommodation as the 
relation extends through time.  The other strain focuses on relations that 
are more often characterized by dependence and inequality, of which 
employment and family relations are prominent examples. 
B. The Insurance Relation as Relational Contract 
The relationship between an insurance company and its consumer 
policyholder is perhaps the best example of a relational contract of 
dependence and inequality.14  The insurance contract is a relational 
contract par excellence.  The relation created by the contract extends 
over time; although a typical policy term is a year, the rate of renewal is 
very high, often in the order of ninety percent, so a typical relation 
 
 12. Ian R. Macneil, Reflections on Relational Contract, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 541, 545 (1985). 
 13. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(j) (2008). 
 14. Insurance policies issued to sophisticated commercial entities bear some but not all 
of the same characteristics as policies issued to consumers.  The discussion in this Article 
addresses only the latter type of policy. 
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extends over years or even decades.  The insurance contract is distinctive 
because, as a contract that transfers risk, performance may never be 
required if the risk insured against never comes to pass.  If the risk does occur, 
however, cooperation and performance in ways not specified in the 
contract are required, particularly on the part of the company; the 
company’s duty of prompt payment and performance in good faith are 
seldom defined in the policy and are only fully realized in the surrounding 
norms of practice and law.  The relation is also situated in a context of 
social relationships; the single insurance contract is an instance of a 
system of insurance on which policyholders, dependents, tort victims, 
and society at large depend to provide security in the event of harm. 
Therefore, the insurance contract is clearly a relational contract.  As 
with any other class of relational contracts encompassing a large number 
of specific examples, it can be described in a number of ways.  As 
relevant to the issue of the first-party bad faith standard, a few different 
elements of the insurance relationship bear emphasis.  The first is about 
the insurance policy, the formal legal contract that creates the relationship.  
The second is about the nature of performances under the policy.  The 
third is about the representation of the relationship by the company and 
the understanding by the policyholder created by that representation. 
The insurance policy is a classic contract of adhesion.  It is a standard 
form contract drafted by the dominant party, the insurance company, and 
adhered to by the subordinate party, the policyholder;15 the dominant 
party enters into many such transactions and the insured enters into few.  
The document typically is not read by the insured and, in significant 
part, is not likely to be understood if it is read; the insurance policy is an 
extreme example of the “agreement now, terms later” form contract 
because the entire policy is never presented at the time the insured first 
purchases it.  The terms are not subject to negotiation; the insured may 
be offered varying policy limits, riders, and amendments, but those are 
also adhesion alternatives that do not dramatically expand the range of 
choices available. 
The insurance policy is a complex document.  Even though personal 
lines insurance policies are now typically drafted in plain language, plain 
does not equate with short or simple.  The policy most commonly 
 
 15. Insurance policies are often promulgated by the Insurance Services Office (ISO)— 
a national insurance industry trade group—and approved by state regulators.  But for all 
practical purposes, the ISO is the voice of the insurance companies and state regulation of 
policy terms is seldom meaningful. 
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purchased by homeowners, the HO-3 policy produced by the ISO, 
contains: three pages of declarations; two pages of general definitions, 
not counting definitions stated elsewhere in the policy; six pages 
describing what property is covered; three pages stating what risks are 
covered; two pages describing what risks are excluded from coverage, 
not counting exclusions stated elsewhere in the policy; three pages of 
conditions on the property coverage; and seven pages describing the 
liability coverage, including more statements of risk, exclusions, and 
conditions.  And that is only the basic policy; attachments might include 
limited earthquake coverage, workers compensation for residence 
employees, oil tank coverage, and other special provisions.16 
From the company’s perspective, the policy plans in detail the terms 
of the relationship, specifying the risks covered and excluded and the 
duties of the company and the insured in the event of loss.  The policy, 
in the jargon of relational contract theory, “presentiates” the relationship 
at the moment of formation by projecting all elements of performance 
and risk from the future into the present and at that moment defining the 
performance and risk terms that govern the relationship.17  From the 
insured’s perspective, the policy is at best a modest exercise in planning, 
specifying a few important items such as policy limits.  This conflict of 
perceptions suggests that the company views the policy as having more 
discrete elements because the norms of implementation of planning and 
effectuation of consent are intensified.  The insured is likely to have a 
different perspective.  The details of the insurance policy become important 
to the insured only at the point of loss.  At that point, because of the 
limitations and exclusions from coverage of which the insured was not 
previously aware, the policy becomes a device by which the company is 
able to avoid responsibility. 
This conflict is exacerbated because, unlike many relational contracts, 
in which both parties perform over an extended period of time, performance 
under an insurance policy is always sequential.  The insured’s essential 
performance is to pay the premium, which it does at the time of formation.  
The company’s essential performance is to relieve the insured of the burden 
of a loss, a performance that is only required later, if at all.  This creates 
for the company the ability to act opportunistically.  When a loss occurs, 
it is in the company’s interest not to pay a claim or to pay as little as 
possible; there is a zero-sum game in play by which every dollar the 
 
 16. A copy of the policy is available on the Insurance Information Institute website.  
Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Homeowners 3—Special Form, http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/ 
binary/748905_1_0/HO3_sample.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2009). 
 17. Ian R. Macneil, Commentary, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 
60 VA. L. REV. 589, 589 (1974). 
FEINMAN FINAL ARTICLE 10/1/2009  11:09 AM 
[VOL. 46:  553, 2009]  The Insurance Relationship 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 559 
company does not pay the insured becomes a dollar of profit for the 
company.  At the time of loss, the insured has few means of compelling 
the company’s performance.  Unlike many other contracts, because the 
performances are sequential, the insured cannot withhold its own 
performance to give the company an incentive to pay because that 
performance, the payment of the premium, has already occurred.  Also, 
unlike many other contracts, once the loss has occurred, the insured 
cannot procure a substitute performance through another contract; a 
buyer whose seller breaches the duty to deliver contracted goods can 
measure its damages by the difference between the contract price and the 
market price or the cover price, but the insured cannot purchase alternative 
insurance against a risk that has already come to pass.  The policy terms 
and the surrounding law that measure the company’s performance, 
including the law of bad faith, are vague and therefore difficult to 
enforce, especially compared to the terms measuring the insured’s 
performance—the insured either does or does not pay the premium on 
time, but whether the company has failed to pay in good faith is much 
harder to determine. 
The conflict between the company and the policyholder arises in large 
part because of the representation of the relationship by the company 
and the understanding by the policyholder created by that representation.  
The typical insured understands the insurance relationship to be one in 
which the company promises security and protection, rather than a 
detailed and obscure set of specifications and exclusions of coverage.  
This understanding is fostered by the presentation of the relationship by 
insurance companies themselves through extensive advertising.  Many 
of the iconic slogans of American marketing portray insurance as a place 
of security and refuge from the dangers of the world: “Like a good neighbor, 
State Farm is there” and “You’re in good hands with Allstate.”  More 
recently, Liberty Mutual’s slogan: “Responsibility.  What’s your policy?” 
II.  FIRST-PARTY BAD FAITH AND THE FAIRLY DEBATABLE RULE 
Speidel commented about the prospect that relational contract theory 
has to inform doctrinal questions: 
The combination of a broader, more complex descriptive theory with the potential 
for the relationship itself to generate internal norms that become part of the obligations 
of the parties both distinguishes relational theory from modern contract law and 
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provides a challenge to courts which are petitioned to resolve relational contract 
disputes.18 
This description of essential elements of the insurance contract as 
relational contract provides a basis for examining the doctrinal focus of 
this Article, the standard applied in first-party bad faith cases.19 
Bad faith can arise in two contexts in insurance cases.  In third-party 
cases involving liability insurance, the company acts in bad faith when it 
breaches its duty to defend or settle litigation against its policyholder.  In 
a typical case, the company rejects an offer to settle the case against its 
insured within policy limits, exposing the insured to a judgment in 
excess of those limits.  In first-party cases, the company acts in bad faith 
when it fails to properly pay a claim for coverage by the policyholder. 
The law of bad faith aims to fully compensate the policyholder for its 
losses when the insurance company in bad faith fails to keep its promise 
to indemnify and, in third-party cases, to defend.  Simply awarding the 
policyholder the amount it was due under the policy would not compensate 
for the delay and expense of obtaining the payment, such as attorneys’ 
fees and other costs and, in appropriate cases, emotional distress.  In 
third-party cases, the compensation includes the amount of the excess 
judgment for which the policyholder is liable, an excess amount that 
resulted from the company’s bad faith failure to settle.  Bad faith law 
also aims to check the insurance company’s temptation to behave 
opportunistically; by delaying or denying payment to the policyholder, 
the company increases its own profits at the expense of its policyholder. 
In third-party cases involving liability insurance, nearly every jurisdiction 
allows an action either in tort or contract or under a fair claims practices 
statute by a policyholder against its insurer for breach of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing inherent in every contract.  In a typical case, 
the insurer breaches its obligation to give adequate consideration to the 
insured’s interest by failing to exercise good faith in settling a case by a 
tort victim against the policyholder, exposing the policyholder to the 
possibility of an excess judgment. 
A much smaller number—about half of the jurisdictions—permit an 
action by the policyholder against a first-party insurer for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.20  Among these jurisdictions, 
 
 18. Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 
94 NW. U. L. REV. 823, 827 (2000). 
 19. The discussion here is about the standard to be applied to evaluate the insurer’s 
good faith, assuming that the jurisdiction allows the action at all.  Although the relational 
analysis that leads to a rejection of the fairly debatable standard also suggests something 
about whether there should be a cause of action at all, I do not address that directly. 
 20. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 
183–84 (4th ed. 2007). 
FEINMAN FINAL ARTICLE 10/1/2009  11:09 AM 
[VOL. 46:  553, 2009]  The Insurance Relationship 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 561 
courts describe the content of the good faith duty in a variety of ways, 
but most require something more than a negligent failure to investigate 
or pay a claim, adopting instead the fairly debatable standard.21  Perhaps 
the most widely cited formulation of the standard comes from the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co.: 
    To show a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff must show the absence of a reasonable 
basis for denying benefits of the policy and the defendant’s knowledge or reckless 
disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.  It is apparent, 
then, that the tort of bad faith is an intentional one.  “Bad faith” by definition 
cannot be unintentional.22 
The court further explained: 
    The tort of bad faith can be alleged only if the facts pleaded would, on the 
basis of an objective standard, show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying 
the claim, i.e., would a reasonable insurer under the circumstances have denied 
or delayed payment of the claim under the facts and circumstances. 
    . . . . 
    Under these tests of the tort of bad faith, an insurance company, however, may 
challenge claims which are fairly debatable and will be found liable only where it 
has intentionally denied (or failed to process or pay) a claim without a reasonable 
basis.23 
Note that calling this the fairly debatable test is something of a misnomer 
because it is not strictly speaking one that measures good faith solely by 
whether the underlying claim was fairly debatable.  Because the court 
characterizes bad faith as an intentional tort, it requires the insured to 
show both that the underlying claim was not fairly debatable and also 
that the company knew that it was not fairly debatable or acted 
recklessly with respect to that issue. 
Later courts created a procedural elaboration on the fairly debatable 
test.  “Under the ‘fairly debatable’ standard, a claimant who could not 
have established as a matter of law a right to summary judgment on the 
substantive claim would not be entitled to assert a claim for an insurer’s 
bad-faith refusal to pay the claim.”24  The summary judgment elaboration 
was both the logical consequence of the requirement that an action for 
bad faith would lie “only if the facts pleaded would, on the basis of an 
objective standard, show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying 
 
 21. Id. at 186. 
 22. 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978). 
 23. Id. at 377. 
 24. Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445, 454 (N.J. 1993). 
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the claim,”25 and it was grounded in policy: 
“[W]hen a claim is ‘fairly debatable,’ the insurer is entitled to debate it, whether the 
debate concerns a matter of fact or law.”  The rationale for this legal principle is 
based upon the potential in terrorem effect of “bad faith” litigation upon the insurer.  
“‘An insurer should have the right to litigate a claim when it feels there is a question 
of law or fact which needs to be decided before it in good faith is required to pay the 
claimant.’”26 
III.  THE FAIRLY DEBATABLE RULE AND THE RELATIONAL APPROACH 
The fairly debatable rule and the summary judgment elaboration of the 
rule is the strong majority rule among jurisdictions that permit a cause of 
action for bad faith in first-party cases.  From the perspective of relational 
contract theory, however, it is deeply flawed. 
Begin with the contrast between the account of the insurance 
relationship implicit in the fairly debatable rule and the description of 
that relation derived from the application of relational theory.  The rule 
is based on a perception that the policy terms are the predominant 
feature defining the relationship. 
The policy defines the scope of the insurer’s liability; as companies 
often say, their duty is to pay what is owed according to the policy, no 
less but no more.  In a coverage dispute, therefore, the insurer is permitted 
to dispute any issue as long as that issue is fairly debatable.  The summary 
judgment elaboration of the rule follows from this posture; if there are 
material facts or legal issues in dispute—if the insured cannot obtain 
summary judgment in the coverage action—then it is not bad faith for the 
company to contest the action.  Indeed, the company is practically required 
to do so.  If the company were to pay a claim when there was a reasonable 
basis for disputing it, the cost of the claim would be unfairly imposed on 
other insureds through an increase in premium costs.  Only when the 
company not only lacks a reasonable basis for disputing the claim under 
the policy terms, but when it also knows or recklessly disregards the 
unreasonableness of that basis, is it acting in bad faith. 
The policy seldom contains explicit terms about the claim administration.  
Instead, the company is bound only by a general provision requiring it to 
adjust the claim and by an implicit policy term, the obligation of good 
faith.  In these cases, too, the standard imposed by the fairly debatable 
rule is absence of a reasonable basis for the action and knowledge or 
reckless disregard of that absence.  To act in bad faith is not merely to 
breach or to breach through negligence, but to act with an element of 
 
 25. Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 377. 
 26. Polizzi Meats, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 931 F. Supp. 328, 334–35 (D.N.J. 
1996) (citation omitted) (quoting Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 376, 377). 
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willfulness, or at least recklessness, to subvert the ends of the deal.  If 
the company unreasonably delays payment of a claim, fails to investigate, 
or denies payment, it has simply exercised its rights under the policy as 
long as it does not act with knowing or reckless disregard of its obligations. 
In short, implicit in the fairly debatable rule is an assumption that the 
insurance company and the policyholder are adverse; the insured has 
only the rights clearly defined in the contract, and the company is 
entitled to vigorously protect its own interests in investigation and 
application of the contract provisions.  From the relational perspective, 
this focus on the terms of the policy, express or implied, incorrectly 
characterizes the insurance relationship. 
As a descriptive matter, this focus situates the insurance contract too 
far at the discrete end of the discrete-relational spectrum.  It assumes that 
the policy represents a considered exercise in planning by the parties that 
deserves to be implemented throughout the relation.  In fact, because the 
insurance relation is a relation of dependence and inequality rather than 
one of bargaining between parties of equal sophistication and leverage, it 
is incorrect to focus on the terms of the policy as fully constituting the 
relationship.  Looking through a relational lens at the way insurance 
policies are drafted through industry collaboration, framed to limit the 
rights of policyholders, redrafted as necessary to account for negative 
court decisions, and imposed on policyholders who will not read or 
understand them suggests that the policy terms are an uncertain guide to 
the content of the relation.  In areas other than bad faith, insurance law 
recognizes this reality, interpreting ambiguities against the company, 
reading grants of coverage broadly and exclusions narrowly, and honoring 
reasonable expectations, among other things. 
The focus on policy terms misconceives the relation in another way.  
The perception that the core of what the insurance company is selling 
and the policyholder is buying is the detailed terms specified in the 
policy is at odds with the representation and understanding of the relation 
as providing protection against risk through a promise of security by a 
trustworthy partner.  Such a partner—a good neighbor, a responsible company, 
someone who keeps you in good hands—does not niggle about terms, 
looking for any reasonable basis to deny coverage, being negligent or 
inattentive to its dependent partner’s needs. 
This point is reinforced by the normative analysis of relational contract 
theory.  Relational contract theory moves from description to prescription 
through its identification of the norms immanent in exchange relations 
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and in the larger society.  Here, I will illustrate by using only one part of 
Macneil’s elaborate structure of the common contract norms, role 
integrity, which takes on enhanced importance in relations. 
In relational contracts such as insurance, roles have not only “an 
element of individual utility enhancement” but also have “intricate 
interlinkings of habits, custom, internal rules, social exchange, expectations 
respecting the future, and the like.”27 The insurance company’s role 
illustrates this complexity.  Although the company’s role includes writing 
policies, investing premiums, and paying claims in order to make a 
profit, its role also includes securing the future of the policyholder in the 
event of loss. This is true not only of the company but also of its 
employees; adjusters, for example, are trained to be empathetic and 
supportive, and industry standards and law demand that they be 
responsive, careful, and protective of the policyholder’s interest.  As 
such, it is a violation of the company’s and the adjuster’s role integrity to 
act in its own interest at the expense of the policyholder unless it has a 
clear basis for doing so. 
Macneil recognizes that roles are conflictual in this way and suggests 
that this conflict can be “a perfectly good basis for normative behavior.”28  
One must balance the short-term interest in maximizing profits against 
the long-term interest in the company’s and the insurance industry’s 
well-being.  The history of insurance is replete with examples in which 
opportunism is maximizing in the short-term for a single company but so 
destructive of public trust in the long-term that it is detrimental to the 
interest of all companies—an example of Nobel Prize-winning economist 
George Akerlof’s proposition that lemons drive out peaches.29  Policyholders 
expect every company “to approximate the product of similar tensions” 
among all companies;30 the insurance industry’s portrayal of itself is of 
security and fairness in the claims process, a portrayal that would be 
violated by denying claims simply because they are fairly debatable. 
This conflict is reflected in the differences between neoclassical and 
relational approaches to contract law and, in turn, by the different 
approaches of the fairly debatable rule and the relational approach.  
 
 27. MACNEIL, supra note 5, at 65. 
 28. Id. at 43. 
 29. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 495 (1970).  For example, policy provisions and 
statutes making life insurance policies incontestable after a period of coverage had passed 
arose because insurance companies frequently used innocent errors by policyholders in their 
applications for life insurance as an after-the-fact basis for avoiding payment on policies.  
This practice threatened the saleability of life insurance.  See Richard E. Stewart & Barbara D. 
Stewart, The Loss of the Certainty Effect, 4 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 29, 41 (2001); Eric K. 
Fosaaen, Note, AIDS and the Incontestability Clause, 66 N.D. L. REV. 267, 268–69 (1990). 
 30. MACNEIL, supra note 5, at 43. 
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Neoclassical law assumes a core of self-interest affected at the periphery 
by custom and regulation.  From that view, the insurance company is 
free to act in its interest and so to maximize its profits except to the 
extent that it is limited by terms of the policy or regulatory restrictions.  
Relational contract law assumes a baseline of obligation in which self-
interest and other-regardingness are intertwined.  Insurance law already 
has adopted at least some relational insights, with some courts regarding 
insurance contracts as sufficiently different from ordinary commercial 
contracts in that they demand an enhanced obligation of good faith.31 
A test for this view of the role is to ask how the participants in the 
contract would regard the fairly debatable rule.32  The rule states that the 
company may resolve doubts in its own favor rather than that of the 
insured and may act carelessly in investigating a claim, determining 
coverage, and deciding whether and when to pay.  Would the insurance 
company be willing to advertise its policies on that basis, and would a 
prospective policyholder buy a policy from such a company?  Would a 
company include a policy provision that rendered it immune from 
liability for bad faith, and therefore not subject to consequential damages 
in the event of a negligent coverage decision or an improper claims 
practice unless it acted with the intent to harm the policyholder’s interests or 
acted in reckless disregard of them, and would a knowledgeable policyholder 
accept such a provision?  None of these are likely because the relation of 
insurance is about security, and the hypothetical advertisement and 
provision are inconsistent with the perceptions of the relation. 
The relational approach also highlights another aspect of the insurance 
relation that the fairly debatable rule ignores or understates: the nature of 
the insurance contract as one of sequential performance that creates the 
potential for opportunism by the insurer.  If one assumption underlying 
the fairly debatable rule is that the policy terms are the touchstone of 
obligation, a second assumption underlying the rule is that the typical 
insurance company ordinarily fulfills the terms of the policy voluntarily 
and in good faith.  Because the company routinely acts properly, it needs 
 
 31. A classic example of the limitation of the enhanced duty of good faith to insurance 
contracts is the rise and fall of bad faith in California law.  See Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. 
Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 671–80 (Cal. 1995); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 
P.2d 373, 389–402 (Cal. 1988) (en banc). 
 32. Indeed, this is a more expansive version of the hypothetical contract approach 
propounded by law-and-economics scholars and judges that attempts to construct the maximally 
efficient terms to which parties would have agreed. 
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to be sanctioned only in the unusual case in which it departs significantly 
from normal behavior by acting with malice or with reckless disregard 
for the policyholder’s rights under the policy.  The relational approach focuses 
attention on the problem of opportunism in general and on its specific 
manifestations in the claim process.  That different focus demonstrates 
further deficiencies with the fairly debatable rule. 
Most of the focus on opportunism in the insurance literature is about 
policyholder opportunism, manifested in moral hazard or adverse selection.33  
But there has long been a significant problem with insurer opportunism.  
Historically, this was often manifested through the behavior that became 
known as “post-claim underwriting.”34  When a claim was presented, a 
company would seize on errors by the insured in the application to deny 
coverage.35  The courts and legislatures recognized this and responded in 
various ways, such as through doctrines of waiver, estoppel, incontestability, 
and materiality of misrepresentation.36  Today, the greater problem is 
opportunism in the claims process. 
As a matter of theory, the attraction to the insurance company in 
behaving opportunistically is obvious.  The company that denies payment 
of a claim in whole or part increases its profits.  The company that only 
delays payment of a claim increases its investment income and thereby 
increases its profit.  Bad faith law aims to deter this behavior.  As a 
federal court in New Jersey said, “Recognition of an action permitting an 
insured to recover damages in excess of the actual amount owed under the 
contract would provide an effective means of countering the existing 
incentives for an insurance company to wrongfully delay or deny payment.”37 
Behaving opportunistically by delaying or denying payment of rightful 
claims is attractive in part because, outside of bad faith litigation, there 
are insufficient controls on or deterrents to opportunism.  Market discipline 
is largely absent because prospective policyholders have no access to 
useful and reliable information about claims practices, and insurance 
companies rarely advertise their claim-paying attributes in meaningful 
ways.  Regulators have been largely absent in this area as well.  Although 
some state regulators have begun to collect claim practices information and 
report it through the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 
the information is not available to the public.  Aside from the occasional, 
exceptionally searching market conduct examination, regulators have not 
systematically addressed claim practices abuses.  The few high visibility 
 
 33. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 4–5 (2d ed. 2008). 
 34. See Thomas C. Cady & Georgia Lee Gates, Post Claim Underwriting, 102 W. 
VA. L. REV. 809, 810 (2000). 
 35. Id. at 812–13. 
 36. Id. at 838–54. 
 37. DiSalvatore v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 624 F. Supp. 541, 543 (D.N.J. 1986). 
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exceptions—the response to insurance practices after Hurricane Katrina 
is the most notable—are the exceptions that prove the rule. 
Beyond theory, although the insurance industry obviously disputes the 
charge, there is substantial evidence that since the early 1990s, insurance 
companies have increasingly viewed the claims process not as the site 
for keeping their promise of security but as a profit center.38  Through 
systematic reorganization of the claims process, incentives to employees 
and managers, and more aggressive approaches to litigation, the companies 
have embarked on a strategy that increases profits at the expense of 
claimants.  This development has taken place across property, casualty, and 
disability insurances as a whole.  The relational approach reminds us to 
focus on context at increasingly finer levels, and that focus reveals 
several particular areas in which opportunism has become a major 
feature of the claims landscape. 
One class of cases involves auto accidents with low-speed impact in 
which the victim suffers injuries that manifest as sprains and strains 
rather than fractures or injuries easily visible on X-rays or other diagnostic 
tests.  These are known as Minor Impact Soft Tissue (MIST) claims and 
are sometimes derided by the insurance industry as whiplash claims.39  
Insurance companies have focused on these as an area in which an 
aggressive posture tends to discourage claimants and therefore reduce 
claims payouts.40  Because relatively smaller amounts of damages are at 
stake, an aggressive defense posture makes it less profitable for an 
attorney to represent a victim on a contingency fee basis, so victims may 
not be able to press their claims.41 
Because MIST claims are often the subject of systematic insurer 
opportunism, they present an area in which courts should be particularly 
watchful in policing behavior.  But the fairly debatable test goes in just 
the opposite direction.  Insurance companies have amassed an army of 
experts in biomechanics, accident reconstruction, and neck and back 
injuries to refute claims in MIST cases, typically by finding that the 
 
 38. This development is the topic of my forthcoming book, JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, 
DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN 
DO ABOUT IT (forthcoming 2010).  See also Jay M. Feinman, Incentives for Litigation or 
Settlement in Large Tort Cases: Responding to Insurance Company Intransigence, 13 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 189, 193–97 (2008). 
 39. See 1 KAREN K. KOEHLER & MICHAEL D. FREEMAN, LITIGATING MINOR IMPACT 
SOFT TISSUE CASES §§ 1:1, 3:1 (2008), available at 1 LMISTC s 1:1, 3:1 (Westlaw). 
 40. Id. §§ 1:3, 5:1, available at 1 LMISTC s 1:3, 5:1 (Westlaw). 
 41. 1A id. § 38:3, available at 1A LMISTC s 38:3 (Westlaw). 
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injuries suffered could not have been incurred in an accident of this type 
or that the victims’ injuries are transitory or the product of malingering 
or outright fakery.42  If the insurance company can produce some of this 
evidence, it raises an issue of fact that prevents summary judgment and 
thus the bad faith claim fails the fairly debatable test.  Therefore, for 
example, when an insurance company can obtain a report of a so-called 
independent medical examination of the policyholder by a doctor 
retained by the insurance company—perhaps routinely retained by the 
insurance company—that is enough to make the claim fairly debatable.43 
A second class of cases involving opportunism includes those cases in 
which the company raises the specter of insurance fraud.  Companies 
have integrated fraud allegations into the claim process, routinely using 
referrals to their Special Investigation Units (SIUs) and suspicions of 
fraud to delay or deny payment.  These suspicions carry weight because 
the insurance industry has been dramatically successful in its campaign 
to raise fears of an epidemic of insurance fraud.  In the minds of the public, 
enforcement agencies, claimants, and judges, the public campaign makes 
more credible the suspicions in individual claims cases.  Allegations of 
fraud, perhaps supported by inferences rather than actual evidence, even 
when met by an overwhelming amount of evidence to the contrary, are 
enough to make the insurance company’s decision to deny a claim seem 
reasonable and thus fairly debatable.  Where, for example, the company’s 
allegations of arson by the policyholder are supported by a few pieces of 
evidence even though the bulk of the evidence exonerates the insured, 
the claim is fairly debatable.44 
The difficulties with the fairly debatable rule from the relational 
perspective are made worse when it is framed in terms that allow the 
insured to establish bad faith only if it would have won a motion for 
summary judgment on the coverage claim.  The summary judgment 
standard states that an insured is entitled to summary judgment “if the 
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any 
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”45  The key to 
summary judgment is whether a factual dispute exists.  As long as there 
is a triable issue of fact, summary judgment must be denied.  The court 
denies summary judgment unless a reasonable fact finder viewing the 
 
 42. 1 id. §§ 7:1, 21:1, available at 1 LMISTC s 7:1, 21:1 (Westlaw). 
 43. See, e.g., Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶ 35, 56 P.3d 524. 
 44. See Polizzi Meats, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 931 F. Supp. 328, 331–32, 
335 (D.N.J. 1996). 
 45. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
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evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion 
would be compelled to find for the moving party. 
As is well known, this is a difficult standard to meet.  As a California 
court emphasized: 
    Because a summary judgment denies the adversary party a trial, it should be 
granted with caution.  Declarations of the moving party are strictly construed, those 
of the opposing party are liberally construed, and doubts as to whether a summary 
judgment should be granted must be resolved in favor of the opposing party.  The 
court focuses on issue finding; it does not resolve issues of fact.  The court seeks 
to find contradictions in the evidence, or inferences reasonably deducible from the 
evidence, which raise a triable issue of material fact.46 
In a bad faith case using a summary judgment standard under the fairly 
debatable rule, all the insurer must do is present evidence that raises a 
factual dispute or persuade the court that the evidence in favor of the 
insured is not unquestionable or does not conclusively establish coverage.  
In a MIST case, that burden can be met by the presentation of expert 
testimony challenging causation or the extent of injuries, evidence that is 
standardized and routinely available.  In a fraud case, that burden can be 
met by having an SIU investigator raise some doubts about benefit or 
opportunity or identify some suspicious facts about the cause of the risk.  
In both cases, the relational understanding of security and the need to 
prevent opportunism is undermined by application of the standard. 
IV.  A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD FOR FIRST-PARTY BAD FAITH CASES 
The fairly debatable rule and particularly the summary judgment 
elaboration on the rule misunderstand the nature of the insurance 
relationship and the contexts in which insurance claims are presented.  
The rule permits the insurance company to act unreasonably during the 
claim process.  It even permits the company to intentionally injure the 
insured’s interest or to act with reckless disregard for the insured’s 
interest as long as there is some evidence that it has acted at the worst 
negligently, that is, that it can avoid summary judgment on the issue of 
intent. 
The perspective that relational contract theory provides on the insurance 
relation suggests a different rule.  A few jurisdictions use such an alternative 
rule that is more attuned to the relationship and its contexts as seen 
 
 46. Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 312, 318 (Ct. App. 2007) (citation 
omitted). 
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through the lens of relational contract theory.47  That rule renders a 
company liable for bad faith if it is negligent in failing to pay a claim 
without also requiring that the company have acted with intent or 
recklessness. 
From the relational perspective, negligence is a better rule because it 
recognizes that the terms of the policy are the starting point for analysis 
of the insurance relationship but, because of the relational character, the 
policy insufficiently defines the terms of that relationship.  That relationship, 
as represented by the company, is one of security, in which the company 
has adopted a role of acting not as an adverse party to its insured but in a 
responsible manner to give the insured the benefits it reasonably expects.  
The rule also recognizes the possibility of insurer opportunism in the area 
of claim practices, and the heightened possibility in particular classes of 
cases, such as MIST claims and fraud allegations.  Such a rule serves the 
broader social role of the insurance relation in providing indemnity and 
security for large numbers of people at the time it is most needed—when 
substantial risks come to pass. 
The negligence rule is consistent with widely accepted standards in the 
insurance industry and the law for the company’s reasonable behavior in 
the claim process.  For example, the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners’ Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act states 
that the company must “effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement 
of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear.”48  
To do this, the company also is required by the statute to “adopt and 
implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and settlement 
of claims arising under its policies.”49  In its investigation, the company 
must be objective, discovering and evaluating facts that support the 
claim and not just facts that give it a basis for turning down the claim.  
The company may not “[c]ompel[ ] insureds or beneficiaries to institute 
suits to recover amounts due under its policies by offering substantially 
less than the amounts ultimately recovered in suits brought by them.”50 
The question raised in first-party bad faith is how closely a company 
must hew to these standards before it violates the norms of the insurance 
relation and acts in bad faith.  The fairly debatable rule and the summary 
judgment elaboration state that as long as a company does not intentionally 
or recklessly violate the standards, it has not acted in bad faith.  Moreover, 
 
 47. STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 5:02 (1997), 
identifies eight jurisdictions that adopt this rule, following the California Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).  Reading the 
cases that he cites suggest this may overstate the number. 
 48. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4(D) (1997). 
 49. Id. § 4(C). 
 50. Id. § 4(E). 
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the determination of intent or recklessness will be made through a process 
that favors the company and disfavors the insured because, unless the insured 
can demonstrate indisputably that the claim was not fairly debatable, bad 
faith is not present. 
From the relational perspective, this fails to embody the norms of the 
insurance relation.  The norms require more.  Providing security and 
avoiding opportunism are not well-served by a company that is careless 
even if it does not intentionally injure its insured or act with disregard 
for its interests.  It is too much to expect an insurance company to get 
every claim right, to investigate correctly, or to give all of the benefit of 
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